Extensions of Value Solutions in Constant-Sum Non-Sidepayment Games

H. Andrew Michener, Mark S. Salzer and Greg D. Richardson
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Greg D. Richardson: University of Wisconsin-Madison

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1989, vol. 33, issue 3, 530-553

Abstract: This article defines two new solution concepts for non-sidepayment games - the λ-transfer nucleolus and the λ-transfer disruption value - and reports the results of an experiment testing their predictive accuracy against that of a third solution concept, the well-known λ-transfer value (Shapley, 1969). The test was based on data from a laboratory experiment utilizing five-person, two-choice games that were constant-sum in normal form. Goodness-of-fit results show that the λ-transfer value and the λ-transfer disruption value were about equally accurate in predicting the observed payoffs to players in these games; both of these solutions were more accurate than the λ-transfer nucleolus.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:33:y:1989:i:3:p:530-553

DOI: 10.1177/0022002789033003008

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