Modeling Strategic Threats

Melvin M. Sakurai
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Melvin M. Sakurai: Research Information Services, Honolulu, Hawaii

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1990, vol. 34, issue 1, 74-91

Abstract: This study evaluates the importance of accurately modeling strategic threats in complex multilateral conflict-of-interest decision problems. The objective is to improve prescriptive accuracy when cooperative n-person game theory is applied to the analysis of such problems. A competitive experiment compares the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function v and Harsanyi function H in terms of descriptive accuracy. Results indicate that H is significantly more accurate than v. This suggests that strategic threats may be an important factor in modeling cooperative games.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:1:p:74-91

DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034001004

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