Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation

Daniel S. Geller
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Daniel S. Geller: University of Mississippi

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1990, vol. 34, issue 2, 291-310

Abstract: The effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on patterns of international conflict is the subject of an extensive but generally impressionistic body of work. Assumptions in this area determine one's confidence in superpower deterrence and fuel the debate over the proper expenditure of military allocations. This study presents an analysis of escalation patterns in interstate disputes among nations with both identical and different levels of weapons technology. The results demonstrate that the distribution of nuclear capabilities does impact the patterns of escalation in serious international conflicts. The findings are supportive of the thesis of competitive risk taking in disputes between nuclear powers but also indicate that the possession of nuclear weapons has no apparent inhibitory effect on the escalatory propensities of nonnuclear opponents. The principal policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:2:p:291-310

DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034002006

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