Port Access and Arms Sales

W. Ben Hunt
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W. Ben Hunt: Harvard University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1990, vol. 34, issue 2, 335-365

Abstract: This article examines the strategic use of arms sales by the Soviet Union. It is concerned with how the USSR, through its arms sales, rewards clients who give it what it wants and punishes clients who do not. This study identified grants of port access and, to a lesser degree, ability to pay in hard cash as the virtually exclusive determinants of variation in the contract terms of Soviet arms sales.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:2:p:335-365

DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034002008

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