Some Notes on Rational Behavior, Normative Behavior, Moral Behavior, and Cooperation

Tetsuo Kondo
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Tetsuo Kondo: University of Chicago, Princeton University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1990, vol. 34, issue 3, 495-530

Abstract: The question of cooperation is examined in terms of both the theory of rational choice and the theory of social norms. Is it possible for rational individuals to bring about cooperation, or is normative behavior needed to maintain cooperation? Through the development of the Learning-Bayesian PD game, the following propositions are obtained. First, cooperation is maintained by farsighted and perfectly rational individuals who have the expectations of reciprocity. Second, however, this cooperation is not stable; disturbance or deviant behavior overthrows cooperation. Third, even under the existence of disturbance, if individuals behave normatively, they can maintain cooperation; normative behavior works as a stabilizer. Finally, if they behave not only normatively but morally (i.e., according to a categorical imperative), they can even transform noncooperation into cooperation; moral behavior works as a catalyzer of the transformation.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:34:y:1990:i:3:p:495-530

DOI: 10.1177/0022002790034003006

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