The Dimension of Superpower Rivalry

John T. Williams and Michael D. McGinnis
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Michael D. McGinnis: Indiana University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1992, vol. 36, issue 1, 86-118

Abstract: The security policies of the United States and the Soviet Union can be interpreted as manifestations of a single “rivalry system.†If each state's security policies are driven by the same underlying factors, then any effort to separate the contributions of internal and external determinants of the arms race is essentially misleading. We use dynamic factor analysis to evaluate whether an unobservable dimension of rivalry explains the dynamics exhibited by the military expenditures and diplomatic hostility of these two states. A one-factor model explains much of the variance of these data series, although some evidence indicates the possible existence of a second factor. More generally, the results of this analysis question the validity of many structural equation models of dyadic interaction.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:1:p:86-118

DOI: 10.1177/0022002792036001004

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