The Prevalence of Free Riding

Per Molander
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Per Molander: Ministry of Finance, Sweden

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1992, vol. 36, issue 4, 756-771

Abstract: The prospects for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in n -person prisoner's dilemmas are studied within an evolutionary framework. Both purely cooperative regimes and states representing a mix of conditionally cooperative with noncooperative strategies turn out to be possible outcomes of the selection process, but only the latter correspond to evolutionarily stable strategies. Two-person games differ qualitatively from games with three or more players in that they are more propitious to cooperative regimes. Spontaneous cooperation in general collective-action games therefore appears less likely than much of the recent literature seems to indicate.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:4:p:756-771

DOI: 10.1177/0022002792036004007

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