Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons

Hugh Ward
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Hugh Ward: University of Essex

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1993, vol. 37, issue 2, 203-235

Abstract: I assume that politicians maximize domestic political support subject to a political feasibility constraint set by the relationship between environmental quality and some politically desirable economic performance indicator. Because pollution flows across national frontiers, the political feasibility frontier depends on other nations' environmental policies. Depending on the nature of domestic political pressures and the environmental spillovers between the countries, various game structures are possible. Knowledge of the structure of the game is helpful when addressing policy issues and the question of how to design international institutions in order to overcome international environmental collective action problems.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:37:y:1993:i:2:p:203-235

DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037002001

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