Concession Behavior in a Bargaining Game

Barry Sopher

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1994, vol. 38, issue 1, 117-137

Abstract: This article reports on an experiment concerned with a two-stage, two-person, simultaneous-demand bargaining game. The focus of analysis is on a prediction for concession behavior in the second-stage game provided by Harsanyi's “risk dominance†principle, which is at odds with the prediction provided by the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the second-stage game. The results of the experiment provide support for the risk dominance prediction, with concessions occurring according to the prediction in 78% of eligible cases, thus outperforming the mixed-strategy equilibrium as a predictor of concession behavior.

Date: 1994
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002794038001006 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:1:p:117-137

DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038001006

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().