Action-Reaction or Rational Expectations?
Will H. Moore
Additional contact information
Will H. Moore: University of California, Riverside
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 1, 129-167
Abstract:
In this article, the author makes a case for expanding our focus from national-attribute studies of intranational conflict toward strategic behavior studies of intranational conflict. One payoff of such a move is that it enables us to specify a linkage between the strategic behavior of both domestic and international actors and thus address the often theorized, but rarely established, intranational-international conflict nexus. Further, the author takes a synthetic approach to the recent debate between action-reaction and rational expectations models of international conflict behavior and derives hypotheses concerning the behavior of both domestic and international parties to an armed intranational conflict. The hypotheses are then tested in a time-series case study design using the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean case for the period from 1957 to 1979. The results demonstrate that there existed an intranational-international conflict nexus in this case and highlight the utility of adopting a strategic behavior approach to studying armed intranational conflict.
Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002795039001006 (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:129-167
DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039001006
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().