The Integrative Complexity of American Decision Makers in The Cuban Missile Crisis

Karen Guttieri, Michael D. Wallace and Peter Suedfeld
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Peter Suedfeld: University of British Columbia

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 4, 595-621

Abstract: The focus of this study is the integrative complexity of information processing of Kennedy administration officials before, during, and after the Cuban missile crisis (CMC). Three elements of the CMC decision-making environment have been commonly noted: a high level of stress, ideological disputes among the decision makers, and the need to present a policy outcome palatable to the American public. Overall, American leaders maintained moderate levels of integrative complexity through even the most dangerous moments of the crisis but showed a pattern compatible with the cognitive manager and disruptive stress models of complexity change in response to environmental challenge. There was no significant difference in the complexity of remarks of the so-called hawks and doves among the Kennedy team, calling into question either the veracity of the alleged rift or the manifestations of value conflict in complexity data. Leadership statements made in camera were significantly more complex than public presentations.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:4:p:595-621

DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039004001

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