High And Low Trusters' Responses To Fear in a Payoff Matrix

Craig D. Parks and Lorne G. Hulbert
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Craig D. Parks: Washington State University
Lorne G. Hulbert: University of Kent

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 4, 718-730

Abstract: Interpersonal trust has long been known to influence cooperation. This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. The hypothesis was formally tested with public goods games and resource dilemma games, with fear manipulated. Results support the hypothesis: when fear was present, high trusters cooperated more frequently than low trusters; when absent, high and low trusters cooperated at the same rate. The findings held across both games. However, the effects of fear within each game were not straightforward: removing fear from the resource dilemma increased low trusters' cooperation rates, but removing fear from the public goods game decreased high trusters' cooperation rates. Results imply that discussion of the role of trust in cooperation must consider whether the particular dilemma contains an element of fear.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:4:p:718-730

DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039004006

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