Getting to Peacekeeping in Principal Rivalries

Brian S. Mandell
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Brian S. Mandell: Harvard University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1996, vol. 40, issue 2, 238-271

Abstract: Through the prism of principal rivalries, this article analyzes the barriers to and opportunities for an Israel-Syria agreement and requirements for an Israel-Syria peace treaty. Empirical work on rivalries focuses mainly on origins, characteristics, and capabilities, with little investigation of principal rivalry termination, the role of peace agreements in interrupting rivalries, or the particular challenges confronting intermediaries in intensely competitive and hostile conflicts. Ending rivalries requires sustained engagement and flexible intervenors. Current proposals for multiphased peacekeeping and verification arrangements fall short. A hybrid peacekeeping model, advanced to address this deficiency, accounts for a rapidly changing military environment, maximizes confidence-building momentum, provides redundancy, attracts U.S. support and participation, and generates regional support for the peace process. By participating in a hybrid regime on the Golan Heights, the United States can conserve resources, limit obligations, minimize risks, maximize flexibility, maintain domestic support, attract support from other third parties, and support peace.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:2:p:238-271

DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040002002

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