Extraction, Allocation, and the Rise and Decline of States

Marc V. Simon and Harvey Starr
Additional contact information
Marc V. Simon: Bowling Green State University
Harvey Starr: University of South Carolina

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1996, vol. 40, issue 2, 272-297

Abstract: Using realist models of international politics that deemphasize the two-level security game that states play, most analyses of hegemonic decline argue that decline is caused by the differential growth of power between hegemons and challenging states. The authors argue that decline is affected highly by states' resource extraction and allocation decisions, and that the international and domestic consequences of these decisions must be analyzed. A model of how states respond to external and internal security threats is outlined and analyzed via computer simulation. The authors find that states are likely to decline if they overemphasize increasing capabilities to deter threats instead of allocating resources to reduce opponents' willingness to attack. In addition, a more “dovish†allocation strategy can be very effective against internal threats. Thus the decline of hegemons and rise of challengers is determined as much by strategies as by constraints posed by the system structure.

Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002796040002003 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:2:p:272-297

DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040002003

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().