Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games

Rick K. Wilson and Carl M. Rhodes
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Rick K. Wilson: Division of Social, Behaviorial, and Economic Research, National Science Foundation and Rice University
Carl M. Rhodes: Department of Political Science, Rice University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1997, vol. 41, issue 6, 767-791

Abstract: It is often assumed that leaders serve as focal points around which followers rally when confronted with a coordination problem. This research begins with one component of leadership—its coordinating role—and disentangles how leadership matters for followers. This analysis proceeds as a simple one-sided signaling game from leaders to followers and investigates when a leader's signals are credible. The empirical analysis is based on a series of laboratory experiments in which groups of four actors were involved in a series of one-stage coordination games. The findings show that although leadership is crucial for coordinating followers, it is not a panacea. The introduction of uncertainty about the type of leader markedly decreases the ameliorating impact of leadership.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:41:y:1997:i:6:p:767-791

DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041006003

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