Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness

Dan Reiter and Allan Stam ()
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Dan Reiter: Department of Political Science, Emory University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1998, vol. 42, issue 3, 259-277

Abstract: Why do democracies win the wars they fight? The authors explore this question by examining whether the armies of democratic states fight with higher military effectiveness on the battlefield, testing two general propositions: that the higher legitimacy of democratic states spurs superior individual soldiering and that democratic militaries are likely to have higher organizational efficacy. The authors test their propositions on a comprehensive set of major battles from 1800 to 1982, using data compiled by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. The authors find that the armies of democratic states tend to fight with marginally better logistics, substantially better initiative, and superior leadership. They also find that all three of these advantages dwindle as wars lengthen and interpret the results as indicating that although soldiers are not more willing to die for democratic governments, the emphasis on individual initiative in democratic culture generates important advantages on the battlefield.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:3:p:259-277

DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042003003

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