Three's Company

David Carment and Dane Rowlands

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1998, vol. 42, issue 5, 572-599

Abstract: In the aftermath of the cold war, intrastate conflicts have emerged to challenge international stability and security. Although some authors have attempted to identify strategies for bringing these conflicts to a peaceful conclusion, these recommendations have not been formally grounded. In this study, the authors develop a game-theoretic model based on the mission's intensity, the salience of the conflict to the intervener, the capabilities of the belligerent, and the belligerent's expected gains from continued fighting. On the prescriptive side, the model focuses on optimal behavior rather than just mission success. On the descriptive side, the model can be used to help explain the success and failures of some past missions.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:5:p:572-599

DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042005003

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