Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and the Problem of Violence

Jakub Zielinski
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Jakub Zielinski: Department of Political Science, University of Chicago

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 2, 213-228

Abstract: This article asks why some attempts at democratization trigger a military intervention while others end peacefully. The author argues that the cause of violence lies in a miscommunication within the government rather than in an intransigence of the opposition. A formal model is analyzed in which opposition, reformers, and military bargain over the extent of democratization. The reformers are better informed than the opposition about the military's attitude toward reforms. Consequently, the opposition treats the behavior of the reformers as a signal about the military. In this model, violence occurs only when the reformers are misinformed about the military. The author tests this result against historical evidence from Hungary and Poland. In 1956, both countries attempted to liberalize their dictatorships. Yet, Soviet military intervention occurred only in Hungary. The author traces the difference in the outcomes to different inferences drawn in the two countries about the Soviet attitude toward reform.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:2:p:213-228

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043002006

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