So You Say You Want a Revolution

John Ginkel and Alastair Smith
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John Ginkel: Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis
Alastair Smith: Department of Political Science, Yale University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 3, 291-316

Abstract: Existing models of revolutions tend to focus only on the behavior of the revolutionaries and do not account for government actions. This article presents a model that captures the decision making of a repressive government, career dissidents, and revolutionary participants. The model shows that (a) governments rarely offer concessions to protesters, (b) dissident activity is more likely to be successful in motivating large-scale protest under highly repressive conditions, and (c) Kuran's hypothesis that regimes collapse suddenly with little warning is confirmed. The authors use the model to interpret the different outcomes that occurred during the successful Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and the failed revolution in China during the Tiananmen Square democracy protests.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:3:p:291-316

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043003002

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