Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force

Ross A. Miller
Additional contact information
Ross A. Miller: Department of Political Science, Santa Clara University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 3, 388-402

Abstract: This study explores the relative propensity of democratic and autocratic regimes to engage in diversionary behavior. Although previous research has focused on the willingness of leaders to engage in conflict, recent studies suggest an alternative explanation: the effect of strategic interaction opportunities. Previous studies suggest that even though democratic leaders may have an incentive to use foreign policy to manipulate domestic audiences, would-be adversaries limit their interaction opportunities. This article extends the analysis to a comparison of the behavior of democratic and autocratic regimes. Using three different indicators of the domestic political vulnerability of leaders—economic growth rates, protests, and rebellions—the results indicate that democratic leaders are apparently more affected by strategic interaction opportunities than their autocratic counterparts.

Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002799043003006 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:3:p:388-402

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043003006

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().