The “Game†of Torture

Leonard Wantchekon and Andrew Healy
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Leonard Wantchekon: Department of Political Science and Economic Growth Center, Yale University
Andrew Healy: Yale University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 5, 596-609

Abstract: The authors explain the prevalence of torture by modeling its institutional structure as a game of incomplete information involving the state, the torturer, and the victim. Once the state endorses torture as a mechanism for extracting information, its will is carried out with positive probability. This is because (a) even a “soft†and “sensitive†state agent might torture the victim to test his or her ability to resist and (b) a weak victim might hold out momentarily to find out whether the torturer is sensitive or “sadistic.†When the state uses torture to intimidate political opposition, all types of torturers will behave sadistically. As a result, torture becomes more widespread and more cruel. The authors explain why a “culture†of individual resistance is the only effective solution to torture.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:5:p:596-609

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043005003

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