Multiple Goals or Deterrence

Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David
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J. Sky David: Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 6, 748-770

Abstract: The functions of international alliances are investigated by testing two models of state behavior with data drawn from nuclear and nonnuclear alliances since 1860. A diversity-of-goals model is based on Morrow's assumption that states pursue two goals through their foreign policies: autonomy and security. The second is the Olson-Zeckhauser theory that alliances provide a collective good to their members. The diversity-of-goals model sees alliances as mechanisms for states to transfer desired foreign policy goals, so that different states join alliances for different reasons. Asymmetrical alliances are mutually preferred arrangements between or among states where different goals are traded and are more likely to work when punishment of defection is credibly threatened. Accordingly, the diversity-of-goals model should find support only in nonnuclear alliances. The Olson-Zeckhauser model should apply more to nuclear alliances. The statistical results support the hypotheses.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:6:p:748-770

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043006004

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