Negotiating a Coalition

William P. Bottom, James Holloway, Scott McClurg and Gary J. Miller
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James Holloway: John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University
Gary J. Miller: Department of Political Science, Washington University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000, vol. 44, issue 2, 147-169

Abstract: The authors examine how negotiators' risk preferences influence the formation of coalitions. Joining a coalition may either increase or mitigate risk depending on the nature of the bargaining problem. In an experimental setting, the authors test whether relative risk preferences influence the likelihood of joining a coalition and the distribution of payoffs in coalitions that form. With inexperienced bargainers, risk preferences predict coalition composition but not payoff distribution. This may reflect the fairly egalitarian agreements reached by these coalitions. With experienced bargainers, risk preferences are unrelated to coalition membership but do predict the distribution of payoffs. Risk preferences influence the course of negotiation in a different manner as parties learn to use both their alternatives and their risk preferences as sources of bargaining power.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:2:p:147-169

DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044002001

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