Fair Division, Adjusted Winner Procedure (AW), and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Tansa George Massoud
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Tansa George Massoud: Department of Political Science, Bucknell University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000, vol. 44, issue 3, 333-358

Abstract: A dispute resolution mechanism called Adjusted Winner (AW), developed by Brams and Taylor, is used to propose a plausible solution to the final status issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Unlike conventional negotiating procedures, AW possesses desirable qualities including equitability, efficiency, and envy freeness. Based on data from an original survey, results show that when the issues of security and borders are kept separate, Israel is likely to have its demands met on the issues of security, East Jerusalem, normalization of relations, and water. The Palestinians will win on the issues of sovereignty, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Israeli settlements in Gaza, and Palestinian refugees. Both sides will need to compromise on the issue of boundaries. If security and borders are lumped together as one issue, Israel and the Palestinians will share on the issue of East Jerusalem.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:3:p:333-358

DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044003003

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