Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Esther Hauk () and
Rosemarie Nagel ()
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2001, vol. 45, issue 6, 770-793
The effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas is examined. Participants played simultaneously several finitely repeated, two-person prisoner's dilemma games. Results show that unilateral choice leads to lower defection and fewer exits than mutual choice. In the unilateral-choice setup, intending defectors are more likely to exit than intending cooperators. Implications of these findings in the political context are discussed.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:6:p:770-793
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