Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups

Jean-Paul Azam ()

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002, vol. 46, issue 1, 131-153

Abstract: A game-theoretic model is analyzed for discussing the determination of looting and fighting activity during a civil war between two ethnoregional groups. The Nash equilibrium of this game emphasizes population size, production capacity and productivity, and access to external funding as the main determinants of the size of the armies and the intensity of looting activity. The Nash equilibrium of the game between the two warlords involves an excessive level of looting. Some lessons are drawn from this framework to bring out the minimum redistribution of resources between groups that must take place in a peaceful equilibrium.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:131-153

DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046001008

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