Motivations for Choice

David L. Rousseau
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David L. Rousseau: Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002, vol. 46, issue 3, 394-426

Abstract: Realists assume that individuals are obsessed with relative gains and that cooperation is the exception rather than the norm in international relations. In contrast, liberal institutionalists assume that, in many situations, individuals are motivated by absolute gains. These critical assumptions are examined. Results show that the salience of relative gains varies with the beliefs of the individual, the nature of the opponent, and the context of the situation, and that individuals often employ alternative pure strategies (e.g., equity) or mixed strategies (e.g., relative gains in the domain of gains and absolute gains in the domain of losses). Decision strategies (e.g., relative gains, absolute gains, joint gains, equality, and altruism) are linked to the growing constructivist literature in international relations.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:3:p:394-426

DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046003004

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