Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes

Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee
Additional contact information
Paul K. Huth: Center for Political Studies Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan
Todd L. Allee: Department of Political Science University of Michigan

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002, vol. 46, issue 6, 754-790

Abstract: A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent democratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of governments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoretical work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the period from 1919 to 1995. Each dispute is divided into three separate stages so that hypotheses about the initiation and outcome of both negotiations and military confrontations, and opposing patterns of war and dispute settlement, can be tested. Results provide strong support for a number of hypotheses concerning the importance of electoral cycles and the strength of opposition parties in explaining patterns of both conflictual and cooperative behavior by democratic states.

Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200202237928 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:6:p:754-790

DOI: 10.1177/002200202237928

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().