Regime Type, Preferences, and War in Renaissance Italy

David Sobek
Additional contact information
David Sobek: Pennsylvania State University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, vol. 47, issue 2, 204-225

Abstract: The democratic peace has received substantial empirical support in the modern international system. The consistency of the results does not imply that reasonable critiques do not exist, that is, the effects of development, liberal economic structures, and preferences. These challenges, however, tend to strongly correlate with democracy, making direct statistical tests inefficient and not necessarily convincing. This study attempts to evaluate these challenges and extend the temporal domain of the democratic peace through an empirical analysis of Renaissance Italy. The data set contains the seven major powers of Renaissance Italy between 1250 and 1494, with measures of war, power, regime type, preferences, and contiguity. The analyses show that joint republicanism, power preponderance, and preference similarity decrease the probability of war.

Keywords: democratic peace; preference; affinity; war onset (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002702251029 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:2:p:204-225

DOI: 10.1177/0022002702251029

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().