Peace through Insecurity

Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans
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Giacomo Chiozza: Department of Political Science Duke University
H. E. Goemans: Department of Political Science Duke University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, vol. 47, issue 4, 443-467

Abstract: The literature on diversionary war has long argued that a leader's tenure considerations play an important role in international conflict behavior. However, for the diversionary use of force to be rational, international conflict must in turn affect the leader's tenure. A two-stage probit model on a new data set of all leaders between 1919 and 1992 is used to examine this reciprocal relationship between the probability of losing office and the probability of crisis initiation. Contrary to theories of the diversionary use of force, results show that an increase in the risk of losing office makes leaders less likely to initiate a crisis, and an increase in the risk of an international crisis makes leaders more likely to lose office. Results also suggest that democracies are overall less likely to initiate a crisis because of the domestic political insecurity of democratic leaders.

Keywords: diversionary war; international conflict; leaders'; tenure; crisis inititation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:4:p:443-467

DOI: 10.1177/0022002703252975

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