Arms Transfers, Military Balances, and Interstate Relations

Gregory S. Sanjian
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Gregory S. Sanjian: Department of Political Science, Bucknell University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, vol. 47, issue 6, 711-727

Abstract: Do arms transfers that widen (or narrow) gaps in military capabilities between rival importers lead to cooperation or conflict? Three fuzzy systems models are developed and tested to assess the impact of U.S., USSR, and third-country arms transfers on the political relationship between India and Pakistan during the years from 1950 to 1991. The arms trade models are influenced by the competing power balance and power transition theories of international conflict, and the tests reveal that the best model combines the effects of both theories. A second set of analyses (involving the same models) on the roles of the arms exporters is less conclusive. Arms shipments from theUSSRto the India-Pakistan dyad were consistent with the principles of power transition theory, whereas the United States and third parties behaved generally as power balancers.

Keywords: arms transfers; power transition theory; balance-of-power theory; fuzzy set modeling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:6:p:711-727

DOI: 10.1177/0022002703258801

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