A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games

Torsten Decker, Andreas Stiehler and Martin Strobel
Additional contact information
Torsten Decker: Institute for Operations Research, Humboldt University Berlin
Andreas Stiehler: Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, vol. 47, issue 6, 751-772

Abstract: One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Keywords: public good; free riding; cooperation; punishment; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002703258795 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:6:p:751-772

DOI: 10.1177/0022002703258795

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().