The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment
Erling Moxnes and
Eline van der Heijden
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Erling Moxnes: Department of Information Science, University of Bergen, Norway
Eline van der Heijden: Department of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, vol. 47, issue 6, 773-795
In the face of global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions? The effect of leadership at the individual level is investigated by the use ofa novel design ofa laboratory public bad experiment with a leader. Twelve groups of5 participants played the game twice with two treatments: 10 rounds with a leader and 10 rounds without a leader. The order ofthe treatmentswas balanced over groups. A significant (within-subject) effect of leadership is found. Followers invest, on average, 13% less in the public bad when there is a leader setting the good example as opposed to a situation with no leader. This produces benefits also to the leaders but not enough to recover all the costs of taking a leading position.
Keywords: leadership effects; public bad experiment; follower decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:6:p:773-795
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