Bureaucrats Versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Eben J. Christensen and Steven B. Redd
Additional contact information
Steven B. Redd: Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 48, issue 1, 69-90

Abstract: The bureaucratic politics model and the poliheuristic theory are used to examine how political advice presented in various contexts influences choice. Organizational advisers who offer endogenous political advice are compared with situations in which the decision maker is offered advice by a separate, or exogenous, political adviser. Results show that decision makers are influenced by political evaluations in a noncompensatory manner, even when this advice is endogenously presented, and that political evaluations (and foreign policy choices) can be affected by the presence of multiple bureaucratic advisers. These findings have significant implications for how information is presented in advisory group settings.

Keywords: Bureaucratic politics model; poliheuristic theory; political advice; decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002703261054 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:69-90

DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261054

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().