The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions

Kaisa Herne and Maria Suojanen
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Kaisa Herne: Department of Political Science, University of Turku
Maria Suojanen: Department of Political Science, University of Turku

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 48, issue 2, 173-193

Abstract: How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income group. Results show that the proportion of Rawlsian choices is bigger in those groups in which there is no veil of ignorance. In group discussions, arguments related to justice are also more common in the no veil of ignorance than in the veil of ignorance treatment.

Keywords: veil of ignorance; income distribution; rawlsian choices; principles of justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:173-193

DOI: 10.1177/0022002703262859

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