The Limitations of Fair Division

Gerald Schneider and Ulrike Sabrina Krämer
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Gerald Schneider: Department of Politics and Management, Universität Konstanz, Germany
Ulrike Sabrina Krämer: Department of Politics and Management, Universität Konstanz, Germany

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 48, issue 4, 506-524

Abstract: Mathematical procedures that promise an envy-free, equitable, and efficient solution to distributional conflicts have received widespread attention. Two fair-division mechanisms, adjusted Knaster and proportional Knaster, which are similar to the well-known adjusted-winner procedure, are compared with the less fair divide-and-choose mechanism. Results show that participants largely prefer the adjusted-Knaster procedure to the two alternatives. Adjusted Knaster, closely followed by proportional Knaster, also promises the highest average payoff. Yet the sophisticated mechanisms cease to perform better than divide-and-choose once actors receive the possibility to deviate from the mandatory bargaining protocols of fair-division procedures. The preference for adjusted and proportional Knaster is found to be a partial function of the participants’ psychological profile. The more “antisocial†a participant, the more likely this respondent is to opt for a procedure with a compensatory mechanism.

Keywords: fair division; experimental political science; bargaining; two-person games; proportional; Knaster; adjusted winner; Knaster (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:506-524

DOI: 10.1177/0022002704266148

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