Going Private

Matthew A. Baum
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Matthew A. Baum: Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 48, issue 5, 603-631

Abstract: This study investigates why, despite the potential credibility enhancement associated with generating domestic audience costs, leaders (in this instance, U.S. presidents) frequently opt to “go private†by conducting foreign policy out of the public spotlight. The author argues that they do so for two primary reasons: (1) public scrutiny disproportionately raises the potential political price of a bad outcome, and (2) leaders’ efforts to generate audience costs can sometimes backfire, as the reactions of the domestic “audience†—once engaged—are not entirely predictable. An analysis of U.S. behavior in all international crises between 1946 and 1994 shows that when national security interests in a crisis are modest, American presidents are indeed less likely to speak publicly about potential adversaries, unless they are quite confident of success if a fight ensues.

Keywords: foreign policy; audience costs; president; war; public opinion; international conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:5:p:603-631

DOI: 10.1177/0022002704267764

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