Bargaining and the Nature of War

Alastair Smith and Allan Stam ()
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Alastair Smith: Department of Politics, New York University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 48, issue 6, 783-813

Abstract: A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.

Keywords: warfare; bargaining; military; random-walk model; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:6:p:783-813

DOI: 10.1177/0022002704268026

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