The Common Priors Assumption

Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay
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Mark Fey: Department of Political Science, University of Rochester
Kristopher W. Ramsay: Department of Politics, Princeton University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006, vol. 50, issue 4, 607-613

Abstract: In a recent article in this journal, Smith and Stam (2004) call into question the usefulness and applicability of what is know as the common priors assumption in the modeling of countries' strategic behavior in international relations. While the authors of this comment acknowledge that it is possible to incorporate noncommon priors in models of politics in a mathematically consistent fashion, they do not agree with the article's claims regarding the limitations of the common priors approach, which motivate Smith and Stam's rejection of it.

Keywords: war; bargaining; common priors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:50:y:2006:i:4:p:607-613

DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289182

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