Terrorists versus the Government

Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler
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Kevin Siqueira: School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006, vol. 50, issue 6, 878-898

Abstract: This article focuses on the strategic interaction between a terrorist group and a government as both vie for grassroots support. When terrorists and the government act contemporaneously, the equilibrium outcome depends on the effectiveness of the government’s countermeasures and the ability of the government to curb popular support of the terrorists through public spending. In two alternative scenarios, the authors establish that leadership may improve both adversaries’ well-being while reducing terrorism. The leader changes in the two cases, with the weaker player going first to the advantage of both players. State sponsorship and franchising of terrorists augment violence as both adversaries expend more effort. Sponsors can offset some strategic limits to violence that competition for supporters offers.

Keywords: noncooperative game; leader-follower; terrorism; counterterrorism; state sponsorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:50:y:2006:i:6:p:878-898

DOI: 10.1177/0022002706293469

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