Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure

Walter Enders and Xuejuan Su

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2007, vol. 51, issue 1, 33-57

Abstract: After the events of 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism became more proactive in that the Patriot Act allowed the authorities far more freedom to directly attack terrorist network structures. We argue that rational terrorists will attempt to thwart such policies and restructure themselves to be less penetrable. We model the trade-off between security and intragroup communication faced by terrorists. The model is used to derive the anticipated changes in network structure and the consequent changes in the type, complexity, and success rate of potential terrorist attacks.

Keywords: terrorist cells; network structure; counterterrorism; terror networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:1:p:33-57

DOI: 10.1177/0022002706296155

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