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Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods?

Margit Bussmann and John R. Oneal
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Margit Bussmann: Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Germany
John R. Oneal: Political Science Department, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2007, vol. 51, issue 1, 88-111

Abstract: According to power-transition theory, war is most likely when the leading state is challenged by a rapidly growing, dissatisfied rival. Challengers are said to be dissatisfied because the hegemon manages the status quo for its own benefit, rewarding its allies and penalizing rivals. We assess the leading state’s ability to distribute the private goods of peace, victory in war, and economic prosperity. States with alliance portfolios similar to the hegemon’s are not protected from aggression; nor do they grow more rapidly than countries with which the leading state is not closely allied. The dominant power’s allies are more apt to win defensive wars, although the means by which this is accomplished are unclear. On balance, our results call into question the ability of the leading state to engineer satisfaction by distributing private goods. Like hegemonic-stability theory, power-transition theory exaggerates the influence of the leading state over the international system.

Keywords: power-transition theory; hegemonic-stability theory; hegemon; international alliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:1:p:88-111

DOI: 10.1177/0022002706296178

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