Discriminatory European Union Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains
Thomas Plümper and
Christina J. Schneider
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Thomas Plümper: Government Department University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom
Christina J. Schneider: Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Oxford, United Kingdom
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2007, vol. 51, issue 4, 568-587
Abstract:
Conflicts between European Union (EU) members about enlargement result from its redistributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing in membership rights serves to compensate the relative losers of enlargement to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all previous enlargement rounds until 2004, we demonstrate that EU members are more likely to demand a discrimination of new members if distributional conflicts arise. The existence of these distributional conflicts in turn increases the odds of EU members and the accession candidates actually agreeing on a phase-in period.
Keywords: European Union; discriminatory membership; EU enlargement; Eastern enlargement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:4:p:568-587
DOI: 10.1177/0022002707302793
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