Sensitivity to Costs of Fighting versus Sensitivity to Losing the Conflict

Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner
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Suzanne Werner: Department of Political Science Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2007, vol. 51, issue 5, 691-714

Abstract: Nations differ in their tolerance for costs of fighting and in their willingness to make concessions. We use a bargaining model of war to analyze these sensitivities. Incentives created by heightened sensitivity to costs often—but not always—contradict those created by heightened sensitivity to making concessions. The results establish the effects of the two sensitivities on key conflict variables such as the frequency with which nations initiate conflicts, are targeted, engage in long or short wars, or receive favorable or unfavorable settlements. It is often asserted that democratic leaders are more sensitive to costs and conflict outcomes than autocrats. If so, then our model suggests that when the two sensitivities reinforce each other, empirical work will yield robust effects of regime type on conflict variables, but when the two sensitivities counter each other, estimated effects will be more ambiguous unless researchers consider which sensitivity dominates.

Keywords: bargaining; negotiations; regime; testable hypotheses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:5:p:691-714

DOI: 10.1177/0022002707304426

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