Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis

Robert Rauchhaus
Additional contact information
Robert Rauchhaus: Department of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, vol. 53, issue 2, 258-277

Abstract: Do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? This article quantitatively evaluates the nuclear peace hypothesis. The results indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability—instability paradox. Evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes.

Keywords: nuclear; deterrence; MAD; mutual (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002708330387 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:258-277

DOI: 10.1177/0022002708330387

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().