Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping

Khusrav Gaibulloev, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu
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Hirofumi Shimizu: Department of Public Policy National Defense Academy, Yokosuka-shi, Japan

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, vol. 53, issue 6, 827-852

Abstract: This article presents alternative estimates for the demand for UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Generally, three-way fixed-effects models, which account for the country, year, and conflict region, provide the best estimates. The demand for UN peacekeeping is primarily influenced by the contributions of other nations (i.e., spillins), with spillin elasticity not significantly different from 1. For non-UN peacekeeping, both spillins and country-specific interests in the conflict region influence contributions. These peacekeepers’ interests include trade and FDI concerns, along with proximity to the conflict. Peacekeeping missions appear partitioned: UN missions for global public benefits and non-UN missions for peacekeeper-specific benefits.

Keywords: UN peacekeeping; non-UN peacekeeping; pure public goods; joint products; three-way fixed effects; voluntary contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:827-852

DOI: 10.1177/0022002709338509

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