Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation

Alastair Smith
Additional contact information
Alastair Smith: Wilf Family Department of Politics New York University, New York

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, vol. 53, issue 6, 853-877

Abstract: Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner’s dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

Keywords: cooperation; infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma; leadership; domestic political institutions; political groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002709344419 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:853-877

DOI: 10.1177/0022002709344419

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().