Arming the Embargoed: A Supply-Side Understanding of Arms Embargo Violations

Matthew Moore
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Matthew Moore: University of Missouri-Columbia, USA, mattmmoore@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2010, vol. 54, issue 4, 593-615

Abstract: Nearly every international arms embargo has been systemically violated by arms exporting states. Although much work has been done exploring why states transfer arms, little has been done to answer the question of why states choose to violate arms embargoes. Earlier studies have found that states transfer arms to one another for a variety of economic and strategic reasons. This study constructs a time series cross-section data set to test whether the same interests that drive dyadic arms transfers also influence the likelihood and size of arms embargo violations. Using a two-stage model of dyadic arms transfers, this study finds that measures for arms import dependence and alliance portfolio similarity best predict the likelihood and size of arms embargo violations. These results provide evidence that state decisions to violate embargoes are driven by political interests more than economic interests.

Keywords: embargoes; economic sanctions; international cooperation; conflict management; capabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:4:p:593-615

DOI: 10.1177/0022002710369085

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