Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind

Stephen E. Gent () and Megan Shannon
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Stephen E. Gent: Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
Megan Shannon: Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2011, vol. 55, issue 5, 710-734

Abstract: International relations scholars have garnered a good deal of evidence indicating that binding arbitration and adjudication are highly effective means for brokering agreements and ending conflict. However, binding third-party conflict management is rarely pursued to resolve interstate disputes over contentious issues like territorial or maritime control. While states value the effectiveness of binding procedures, they are reluctant to give up the decision control necessary to submit to arbitration or adjudication. The authors identify three factors that influence the willingness of states to give up decision control: issue salience, availability of outside options, and history of negotiations. An analysis of attempts to settle territorial, maritime, and river claims reveals that disputants are less likely to use binding conflict management when they have a greater need to maintain decision control.

Keywords: conflict management; arbitration; adjudication; decision control; contentious issues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:55:y:2011:i:5:p:710-734

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