The Dark Side of Altruistic Third-Party Punishment
Andreas Leibbrandt () and
RaÃºl LÃ³pez-PÃ©rez ()
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RaÃºl LÃ³pez-PÃ©rez: Facultad de Ciencias EconÃ³micas, Universidad AutoÃ³noma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raúl López-Pérez
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2011, vol. 55, issue 5, 761-784
This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these findings for social theory are discussed.
Keywords: altruistic punishment; efficiency; inequity-aversion; third parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:55:y:2011:i:5:p:761-784
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